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This article presents anontological proof thatGod is impossible. I define an ‘impossibil-
ity’ as a conditionwhich is inconceivable due to its a priori characteristics (e.g. a ‘square
circle’). Accordingly, said conditions will not ever become conceivable, as they could in
instances of a posteriori inconceivability (e.g. the notion that someone could touch a
star without being burned). As the basis of this argument, I refer to an a priori observa-
tion (Primus, 2019) regarding our inability to imagine inconsistency (difference)within
any point of space. This observation renders the notion of absolute power to be incon-
ceivable, a priori. I briefly discuss themoral implications of religious faith in the context
of Purism: a moral rationalist paradigm. I conclude that whilst belief in God can be
aesthetically expressed it should not be possessed as a material purpose, due to the
illogicality of the latter category of belief and/or expression.With this article I provide
conceptual delineation between harmless religious belief and expression—which, I
argue, should be protected from persecution, as per any other artistic expression—
and religious belief and expression which is materially harmful to society.Whilst I aim
to protect religious freedom of expression on one hand, I duly aim to reduce instances
of material faith in God(s) on the other. Finally, I aim to bring hope in the possibility
for human salvation via technology—such that they should exist indefinitely as ‘demi-
gods,’ defined by conditional, relative power over their environment.
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The content of Thomas J. Coleman iii and Robert B. Arrowood’s (2015) Only
we can save ourselves: An atheist’s ‘salvation’ betrays its title; by page 14, the
authors concede that “God is not ruledout of the equation,He is only anoption”
(Coleman & Arrowood, p. 14). In this article I attempt to deny the conceptual
possibility of God(s) through highlighting that their a priori characteristics are
inconceivable. Consequentially, I will attempt to advance the notion that the
materials of all beings—whether deity or human—are mortal and that only
mortals can save themselves from death (through technological progression). I
will present an ontological proof for the impossibility of deities with absolute
properties—God(s)—by demonstrating that they would be inconsistent with
the concept of an absolutely consistent fabric, ‘space,’ which conceivably must
be the basis for physical reality. I have previously (Primus, 2019) highlighted
our a priori inability to conceive that the nature of space is anything other than
consistent, and thusdeterministic.This apriori argument—that space cancon-
ceivably only possess a single attribute: absolute consistency—will be briefly
revisited in this text. After describing our inability to consider that the fabric
of space is anything other than absolutely consistent, I define God(s) in accor-
dance with the conceived nature of most classical theistic Gods: entities which
are capable of being and/or wielding power absolutely, such that their power
cannot be reduced or attained by natural entities (e.g. humans). I argue that
two absolute entities—i.e. God and space—are conceptually irreconcilable at
any point of space and time. I further pre-empt a theist counter-argument that
God’s spirit and “Kingdom” could be ethereal by nature and transcend space
and time.
Following my presentation of the ontological proof within, I introduce the
nascentmoral rationalist framework known as Purism (Primus, 2021). I use this
framework to briefly discuss the moral impermissibility of material religious
beliefs and expressions. Purism makes a vital distinction between ‘material’
beliefs and expressions—those which necessarily affect others—and ‘forma-
tional’ beliefs and expressions—those which need only subjectively affect oth-
ers, if at all. Whilst I am attempting to remove all irrational belief with one
hand, I am also striving, with equal force, to ensure that there will always be
a place in our future for freedom of expression and belief, including belief in
God(s).To reconcile these apparently contradicting aims, I introduce readers to
the notion that it is specifically the purpose for which any belief is sought, not
the nature of the belief itself, that determines whether it is morally acceptable
or not from amoral rationalist perspective. Accordingly, I will offer that people
holding and expressing religious beliefs for formational purposes—sought for
the purpose(s) of desire—do so under the auspices of free expression, whereas
those doing so for material purposes—acting for purposes of perceived need,
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whose use of public resource necessarily and objectively affects others—are
unjustified in possessing irrational belief, such as belief in God(s). This distinc-
tion is similar to the widely-regarded normative requirement for separation
between ‘church and State,’ though it is slightly more nuanced, advocating a
separation between irrationality (of all types, which includes material expres-
sions of religion) and the entities we need (which includes both States and
states: human actions, thoughts and beliefs, their bodily composition, infras-
tructures, tools, and any other institution or entity which is needed). The
proper place for religious expression, I argue, is when it is desired (wanted)
for the sake of being desired—sought as an end—and thus not sought under
the belief that it is needed. This normative distinction is necessary in the wake
of indiscriminate anti-religious campaigning by the so-called “New Atheism”
movement, personified by authors such as RichardDawkins (2008), SamHarris
(2005), and Christopher Hitchens (2007; Johnson, 2013). The popular works of
these authors are specifically targeted, not to academics but to the lay general
population (Johnson, 2013). It is within this group that we find those who are
not necessarily expressing religion in a material capacity (e.g. as an academic,
elected official, community leader, teacher, parent, or as an individual seeking
to make the world a ‘better place’), but whom are rather seeking religion for
personal, aesthetic purposes (e.g. for the sake of enjoyment or for sentimen-
tal reasons). These beliefs and expressionsmust be protected and preserved, as
per any artistic expression.
Before preceding to specifics within the discussion, I will emphasize three
general points of the ontological argument. These three points aim to address
recurring themes of initial resistance that I encountered during preliminary
discussions of the article with peers of varying beliefs and disciplines.
Firstly, readers should note that the inconceivability of a notion—one’s
inability to imagine a particular concept—is a real and powerful force in
the context of intellectual inquiry. Theists (see, for example, Jake Beardsley,
2019) implicitly acknowledge the power of this force when they recognize that
even an omnipotent God cannot create what they cannot conceive (Beards-
ley uses the example of God being unable to create “square circles”). In other
words, the inability to imagine (a ‘square circle’) has been viewed by theists
as a universal metaphysical limitation which transcends even God’s omnipo-
tence. I have discussed the force of inconceivability in more detail elsewhere
(Primus, 2019), though of relevance here is the caveat that the power of incon-
ceivability is imposed as a passive force; it is only applicable for the dura-
tion and to the conceptual locale that one considers. I (Primus, 2019) use
the analogy that inconceivability in the mind of one attempting to consider
a notion is like a brick wall in the path of one attempting to run along a
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path: for the force of the wall to take effect and block the person’s advance,
the person must (actively) run into it. The wall provides counter-resistance
to the person attempting to move through it, though if a person avoids mov-
ing into the wall, it provides no direct force (it may indirectly ‘force’ them to
change their path). Similarly, a person considering whether God is conceiv-
able must consider the possibility of God deeply enough for the force to take
effect; each time they consider the nature of space to the necessary degree
of conceptual depth they will be forced to accept that they cannot also con-
ceive of God. Alternatively, as per the runner who avoids the wall, so too may
they avoid consideration of necessary conceptual depth. This is where the-
ist debaters typically leave the discussion; they want to continue conceiving
of the possibility of God and so they return to their superficial conception of
God by disengaging from the argument. Similarly, readers will be able to avoid
this force and continue believing that God is conceivable through disengage-
ment.
Secondly, the inconceivability of God lies within the conception of God in
conjunction with the concurrent conception of an absolutely consistent space.
Both God and a consistent space can each be conceived in isolation, as is evi-
dently the case when various manifestations of God are conceived on a daily
basis. The inconceivability of God, therefore, does not suppose our inability
to merely imagine the symbol of ‘God,’ nor does it suppose our inability to
conceive (in isolation) that which the symbol of God represents: an entity of
absolute power. Our ability to conceive of God, either as a creator separate from
their creation or as an all-encompassing entity, whilst disregarding appropriate
consideration of the properties of the conceivable external world—properties
which are irreconcilable with God—allows us to superficially conceive that
God is possible. The same phenomenon applies as observers conceptually
sweep over Penrose’s ‘impossible triangle’ (Penrose & Penrose, 1958). Depicted
below in two dimensions, the shape can superficially be conceived to exist as
a three-dimensional possibility if a person considering the shape traces their
focus along each face, reaching each of its three vertices (A, B and C) in isola-
tion (i.e. one in anymoment). Vertices A, B and C can conceivably each exist as
three dimensional objects when considered in isolation, just as God is conceiv-
able in isolation; it is onlywhenwe consider each of the various components of
Penrose’s triangle together (e.g. each side and vertices A, B, C) that we cannot
conceive of how it could be realized as a three dimensional object.
Thirdly, the apparent consistency within the material of our world—which,
I argue,we are forced to conceive each and every timewe consider the nature of
our fundamental material with sufficient conceptual depth—is not inherently
obvious. There are, after all, only a minute number of universal truths that we
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figure 1 Depicts a Penrose triangle, with vertices labelled A, B, C; it is conceivable
that each vertex could exist as a three-dimensional object in isolation from
each other, though not when each is considered interacting with each other.
Alternatively, each can be conceived to interact with each other in two-
dimensions, though this interaction cannot be conceived in the context of a
third dimension—D(epth).
can know for certain and—René Descartes aside—we typically do not spend a
lot of time, if any, considering them in the course of our daily life. The consis-
tency of space is one of these truths, though it is not immediately apparent. I
have been required to explain the concept of the inconceivability of inconsis-
tency within space a number of times tomost peers engaging in this argument
before it became conceptually clear in their minds. I have tried to present the
argument as clearly as I can in a few varyingways, though readersmay require a
number of read-throughs before they grasp the concept. I implore readers not
to ‘run away from the wall’.
I will now discuss what I (Primus, 2019) offer is the origin of our ability to
know certainty: our inability to conceive of difference within space. In other
words, I beginwith the aspect of ourworld that we are forced to conceivewhen
we consider thematerial nature of our world with sufficient conceptual depth.
I will then demonstrate how attempts to reconcile this aspect with the notion
of God—an entity of absolute power—ultimately fail.
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1 The Inconceivability of Difference At Points In Space (idapis)
Any degree of difference is conceivable across, yet inconceivable within,
space.
In a recent article (Primus, 2019) Imake an a priori observation that every point
of spacemust unvaryingly be conceived as absolutely consistent. This observa-
tion can be otherwise known as the Inconceivability of Difference at Any Point
In Space (which I abbreviate as ‘idapis’). This inconceivabilitywill be summar-
ily explained herein; however, I direct readers to my previous text (2019) for an
expanded discussion.
For the purposes of this article I define inconsistency as simply “difference”
(Primus, 2019, p. 8). This broaddefinition encapsulates all types of change (vari-
ation and/or limitation) across space or time. Consistency is therefore nega-
tively defined as “the absence of any difference or change, across space or time”
(Primus, 2019, p. 8). In sum, absolute uniformity of space across time is consis-
tency, whilst any deviation from this absoluteness is considered inconsistency.
I adopt de Laguna’s definition of a point as “[a]n abstractive element in which
no other abstractive element lies” (de Laguna, 1922, Def. xi, p. 454). By ‘space’
I refer to all types of spaces: physical and conceptual, of any ontological con-
struction; I refer to the area of reality in its most radical inclusion. Finally, by
use of the term ‘space,’ I am, by default, specifically referring to the nature of
the fabric which is the basis for all these types of spaces, rather than the nature
of the various forms and structures which conceivably must be created from
said space.
A notable consequence of a consistent fabric of space is that difference
at or within any individual point of space is inconceivable. In other words, a
consistent space necessitates that each individual point of the infinite points
both across and within itself (i.e. smaller points inside former points) are non-
permitting of difference (i.e. variation or limitation). We do, of course, experi-
ence difference all around us in our daily life (e.g. the perception or conception
that person A is different from their environment, B); these differences are
the various forms and structures that I refer to above and the nature of these
entities is, of course, not consistent. To simultaneously allow for these differ-
ences and an absolutely consistent space, I offer (Primus, 2019) that difference
can conceivably occur across multiple points of space, but not within indi-
vidual points of space. The terms within and across are emphasized because
it should be further noted that they necessarily precede the terms individual
andmultiple, respectively. Here I emphasize that the conception of difference
across spacenecessarily involves the conception of difference occurring atmul-
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tiple (i.e. two or more) points of space; a difference, by definition, implies the
involvement of at least two aspects (e.g. the one part that is unalike at least one
other part). Alternatively, any attempts to conceive difference at points within
(points of) space necessarily involves the imagination of individual (i.e. singu-
lar) points of space—the point at which two or more entities or differences
are supposed to conceivably coincide (Primus, 2019). In other words, I argue
that we can conceive that a point on the shirt of person A, whom is wearing
a red shirt—point A—is different from a point on person B, whom is wearing
a blue shirt—point B—and sitting across (space) from person A in a doctor’s
waiting room. However, if we sit person A and B next to each other and con-
ceptually ‘zoom in’ to investigate the space within the space which separates
point A and B, at no point can we conceive that there is an individual point
which embodies both red and blue (or any type of difference). Readers will
find it impossible to imagine that two entities—for example, the ‘redness’ of
point A, and the ‘non-redness’ of C, the space that surrounds A—could coex-
ist at a single point, without also being able to conceive two smaller points
within said point: a point for each aspect of difference. Superficially, onemight
consider that person A and the surrounding space, C, are different from each
other and are therefore two separate entities. If onemore-deeply considers the
space between A and C, however, it is impossible, with conceptual magnifica-
tion, to imagine a point where both remain as separate entities (i.e. the single
pointwhich embodies the difference—both aspects—of AandC). If one imag-
ines the surface of A and the space of C as two separate entities it means one
can zoom-in further until one reaches a single point, which will either be con-
ceived as a singular entity or still as two separate entities. The latter conception
indicates that one has not zoomed-in far enough because it is still not the sin-
gle point at which they meet. If one conceptually ‘zooms-in’ and continues to
imagine person A as separate from space C—and thus one still considers them
as two separate entities—this indicates that the considerer is actually imagin-
ing two points, not one point; I ask them to conceive the (singular) point where
the shirt of person Ameets the surrounding ‘nothing’ of C—it must be a single
point (Primus, 2019).
At first consideration this observationmay appear as an equivocationwhich
exploits the definition of a point as the smallest conceived entity at any
moment. But this is rather a demonstration of our inability to imagine discrete
differences when we conceptually ‘zoom in’ to the space which separates two
different, discretely perceived or conceived entities. The necessary conclusion
is that expressions of difference, as per space itself, can only conceivably exist
continuously, across multiple points, rather than discretely, at or within indi-
vidual points (whether or not they behave as such in physical reality is beyond
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the scope of this argument and indeed epistemological insight more generally;
the force of this argument deals with the (in)conceivability of inconsistency
within space). In other words, given appropriate consideration, we are forced
to imagine the existence of a (singular) continuity. Another way of considering
the necessary continuity of space—whether embodying difference or not—
is to attempt to conceive that space could be limited in its nature rather than
infinite. A limited space, which does not extend infinitely within each point
of itself and indefinitely in each direction, would require the conception of
a difference at the point where space ends and something-other-than-space
begins.1
Perhaps themost important implication of a consistent space is the require-
ment that all differences must be conceived to exist conditionally—not abso-
lutely—as temporary properties (e.g. velocity, mass, direction, force). That is,
if any point of the fabric of space itself cannot be conceived to embody differ-
ence, then the differences we observe must manifest themselves as fluid states
(motions) of space (Primus, 2019). It is conceivably the absolute consistency of
space which enables these properties to exist as relatively simplistic, passive
structures (e.g. sub-atomic materials, atoms, molecules). It is the relative con-
sistency of these passive materials which could plausibly allow for more com-
plex and active entities to exist (e.g. cells, animals, humans, governments). In
addition to the physical structures of reality, the consistency of all conceptual
structures (e.g. laws of physics, truth, logic)might also be derived from the con-
sistent nature of simplematerials, and ultimately, the idapis (Primus, 2019). In
other words, the consistency of space conceivably provides predictability, reli-
ability and stability within both the physical structures of reality, and the con-
ceptual structures conceived or perceived within theminds of those observing
reality. The conditional nature of all entities other than space—each conceiv-
ably existing as properties of space inmotion rather than as absolutely existing
properties—is noteworthy for the purposes of this article. If only space can
be absolute, then each of these subsequent structures are mortal in nature;
they owe their existence to natural, mortal processes; they can be created and
destroyed.
1 Beyond being unable to imagine this point of difference—and noting that any space could
be conceived to embody anything (with the exception of difference at a point), including
nothing—readers should also find it impossible to conceive of the something-other-than-
anything-or-nothing which would extend beyond the limits of space.
Downloaded from Brill.com11/23/2020 08:05:47PM
via free access
168 purism
Secular Studies 2 (2020) 160–178
2 Impossibility
If one can conceive it, it is not impossible.
I define impossibility as a priori inconceivability. That is, the notion of impossi-
bility describes a condition which cannot be conceived on the basis that such
would necessitate the conception of inconsistency—the presence of differ-
ence (i.e. variance and/or limitation)—within (a point or points of) space. I
emphasize that it is the a priori nature of this inconceivability which renders
it as a true impossibility, never to become conceivable across time and space.
A square circle is impossible because such a notion will always be inconceiv-
able. This notion of impossibility is independent from empirical (a posteriori)
consideration. An impossible condition will not suddenly become possible to
an observer who becomes ‘more knowledgeable’; if it is a true impossibility,
one cannot subsequently ‘discover’ how a previously thought-to-be-impossible
condition is orwas actually possible. For example, if I were to impose the axiom
that mathematics must be limited to directly (literally) describing quantities
of points of physical space and their relationships, we can have certainty that
‘x,’ in the equation ‘1+1 = x,’ equals ‘2’. It is impossible, because it is inconceiv-
able a priori, that ‘x’ could suddenly, at a future point in time or a distant point
in space, equal ‘3’ (or any other number). We know this a priori because the
equation ‘1+1 = 3 (or any other solution other than 2)’ would require the con-
ception of difference within points of space. That is, at some point we would
need to imagine that two ormore points of space are also, at the samemoment,
individual points of space (or vice-versa—that individual points of space are
also, at the same moment, two or more points of space—depending on the
solution and which side of the equation we consider). Similarly, the Penrose
triangle (Penrose & Penrose, 1958) is considered impossible rather thanmerely
improbable because it is inconceivable, a priori, that it could ever be realized
in three-dimensional Euclidean space. For the triangle to be realized in three
dimensions, some of its points would need to permit difference within them-
selves (i.e. at various points along its frame, individual points would also con-
currently need to be considered as two ormore points, or two ormore points of
the triangle would need to be concurrently considered as individual points). If
one has the cognitive faculties to understand the necessary conception of con-
sistency within space, one has the faculties to understand the enduring (i.e.
unconditional) nature of impossibility.
By contrast, we can conceive that no a posteriori conditions should be
deemed to be universally inconceivable, whether across time or space. There
are too many philosophers to list here—though perhaps most famously, Plato,
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in his Allegory of the Cave—who have highlighted the largely veiled nature
of the empirical world, which we appear to each view through our personal
prisms. A posteriori conditions that would require an unusual change of space
in an unusual period of time, such as a reindeer materializing in front of the
reader, or a human touching the sun without being burned, may appear highly
‘implausible,’ ‘impractical,’ or ‘improbable’; they may even be temporally or
locally inconceivable (i.e. inconceivable to a person at a particular time or
space), but we can conceive that they are not universally inconceivable. We
know this because we can conceive, a priori, that any amount of change (dif-
ference) is possible across (though not within) any amount of space, in any
amount of time. This aligns with the well-known mantra ‘anything is possible’
that existswithin contemporary popular culture (the correctmantra is perhaps
‘anything is possible across space, though only purity (consistency) is possible
within space’). Accordingly, ruling-out all a posteriori events from the realm of
impossibility merely requires the cognitive faculties to realize that any nature
of conceptionwhich involves the perception or conception of difference across
(i.e. between two or more points of) space and time is possible. I offer that
events which are of an infinitesimally small probability and yet which can con-
ceivably be conceived should not be deemed impossible, and rather that the
term is reserved for a priori inconceivability.
3 God(s) and Demi-gods
Power can be demonstrated; its absoluteness cannot.
For the purposes of this article, I define a God using the minimum character-
istics as shared by the Gods of classical theism (for examples, see Smith, 1958).
A God is an entity capable of exerting power—the degree of which being irrel-
evant to its classification as a God—whose power exists absolutely—i.e. intrin-
sically, as a nature which is unable to be reduced (e.g. degraded or destroyed),
or (re)created/replicated, except perhaps by its own arbitration. Accordingly,
I offer that there are two essential components to a God. The first is that they
must be capable of deliberately and independently exerting power, irrespective
of their degrees of omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, or benevolence.
This power must influence worldly states in some capacity, whether at the
beginning of time, as the first cause, or throughout time. The second aspect of a
God is perhaps themost crucial as it separatesGod(s) fromother entitieswhich
wield power (e.g. humans): a God’s power exists supernaturally as an uncon-
ditional phenomenon. Their power cannot be attained, nullified or reduced
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in any capacity, except by its own choosing.2 Therefore, neither the degree of
omnipotence nor omnipresence of such power is relevant to this proof, nor
is the nature of how God ‘is,’ whether of spirit or other non-corporeal nature.
Rather, the distinguishing feature of a God is that their power, however and
wherever, affects the world as an arbitrating (non-instrumental) nature and
cannot be reduced or attained by mortals, due to its absoluteness.
The above two minimum requirements of a God should be intuitively
accepted by classical theists on the basis that they are characteristic of each
of their (classical) Gods. Ultimate power alone is insufficient: if a God’s power
were absolute in magnitude (i.e. the most powerful entity that one could
conceive) and yet this power could be attained or reduced by mortals, then
such “God” is more accurately a powerful mortal. Similarly, absolute (intrinsic,
unconditional) existence alone is inadequate: a God must possess the ability
to actively exert power. For this reason, Spinoza’s (1677) passive and determin-
istic, pantheistic “God” does not ‘qualify’ as a God according to the definition
herein. Although absolute (irreducible, intrinsic) in its nature, Spinoza’s “God”
is not a God because it cannot deliberately and independently exert power
itself. Rather, it is conceived as the (passive) instrument by which (all) power
is exerted.
To clearly distinguish conditional states of power from absolute states of
power I offer that conditionally powerful entities, whether they be human or
theistic, may be called ‘demi-gods,’ or even simply abbreviated as ‘gods’ (with
a lowercase ‘g’). (Demi-)god-like status is a conditional state, defined by one’s
mortal ability to wield (relative) power over other mortal entities and/or one’s
environment. For example, beings whosematerial bodies allow them to poten-
tially live forever and which can manipulate their environment in accordance
with their intent would be said to possess a bodily material which is god-like
compared to contemporary humans. However, irrespective of their relative
power, demi-gods are always reducible; they can be destroyed, surpassed and
superseded; their power is not absolute. The conditional, non-absolute power
of a demi-god or god can be contrasted to the absolute power of a God.
2 A God which diminishes itself such that it no longer independently exerts power, and/or
whose power is no longer wielded absolutely (i.e. it is reducible through factors beyond the
will of the God) would no longer be a God.
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4 The Impossibility of God(s)
If you ever stand before “God,” ask them not how they will convince you
that their power is absolute; ask themhow theywill convince themselves.
Gods are impossible (inconceivable, a priori) for the reason that the abso-
lute attribute of space—consistency: we must conceive of space as absolutely
consistent, and thus omnipresent, across and within itself and time—is con-
ceptually irreconcilable with the absolute attribute(s) of God(s). Two or more
absolute entities would require the conception of a difference at the point(s)
where theywould interact; this is an inconceivability, as earlier demonstrated.3
As Spinoza (1677) realized, there can be only one absolute entity. It must be
absolutely consistent (Primus, 2019) and, by extension, absolutely passive and
determinable (Spinoza, 1677).4 Consistency is the only conceivable fundamen-
tal property of space and its material entities (Primus, 2019)—even if our con-
temporary a posteriori observation and knowledge cannot yet predict and fully
understand many of the conditional properties of these entities (e.g. as per
the apparent indeterminability of sub-atomic, human, and government bod-
ies). Accordingly, the concepts of “God” and “consistent space” are conceptually
irreconcilable in the samemanner that a ‘square’ and a ‘circle’ are conceptually
irreconcilable when considered interacting with each other as a ‘square circle’.
I predict that opponents of this argument will attempt to counter that “God”
may not embody any state and rather that their spirit influences the world
through trans-corporeal, ethereal means. I reply that either God’s power has
some metaphysical effect—as a creator in the beginning and/or as an arbiter
throughout time—or it is not power and they are not, by definition, a God
(as per Spinoza’s, 1677, pantheistic “God,” for example). That is, if a “God” can
somehow—wherever, however—affect the conceivably necessarily consistent
fabric within our material world, theists must attempt to conceive the point(s)
between it and the “ethereal” effects of God’s intervention. Similarly, for the rea-
son that we cannot conceive of where or how the space of our world could end
and something-other-than-space could begin, we cannot conceive of how an
3 Spinoza (1677) notes that two infinite substanceswould be impossible because theywould be
“absurd,” yet does not offer a reason for the absurdity. I agree with Spinoza’s observation and
offer (Primus, 2019) that the idapis is the underlying basis for Spinoza’s notion of ‘absurdity’.
4 Though both are deterministic and passive in their nature, Spinoza’s (1677) pantheistic “God”
is said to possess “infinite attributes” and extend beyond the material world, whereas Purist
space (Primus, 2019) is purely materialistic in nature and necessarily possesses but a single
attribute: consistency.
Downloaded from Brill.com11/23/2020 08:05:47PM
via free access
172 purism
Secular Studies 2 (2020) 160–178
ethereal God or their Kingdom (e.g. ‘Heaven’) could exist separate to (within or
outside) this world. Rather, we can only conceive that the consistency of space
must permeate through all of physical reality, be it of heaven or earth. Accord-
ingly, if theists should attempt to use the shrouded nature of the ethereal as
an explanation for the inconceivability of God they are hampering their own
efforts to conceive of how “Gods” and their “Kingdoms” could exist in conjunc-
tion with our world. That is, the blurring or omission of a vertex of the Penrose
triangle hinders, rather than enhances, one’s ability to conceive of all three in
existence at once. Of course, those intellectually brave theists, such as Beard-
sely (2019), who do dare to concretely imagine Heaven, are still defeated by
the limitation of inconceivability. They cannot conceive of how a square circle
could exist, either within or external to Heaven, and likewise they cannot con-
ceive of how Heaven could exist within or external to this world. But at least
they possess the courage to ‘walk towards the wall’.
5 TheMoral Implications of Material Religious Faith
That which is needed, should be logical in nature; that which need not be
logical should be as one desires.
Purism is a nascent moral rationalist paradigm, which asserts a priori defi-
nitions of beings (personhood) and morality (Primus, 2021). I argue that to
logically determine the moral value—or, in some instances, the absence of
moral value—of any state (e.g. a belief or expression) we must foremost dis-
tinguish between whether a state is sought as an end (final form), or sought
as a means to an end. States sought as ends or forms, I will term ‘formational’
states. The residual states—those which are non-formational in nature—have
potential to serve as a means of realizing formational states; I will term these
‘material’ states. Conveniently, formational states and material states can be
respectively viewed to satisfy the notions of desire (want) and need. That is,
forms—each an end in themselves—are beliefs and expressions that people
want to possess for the sake of possessing—for no higher purpose. These states
can be contrasted to the (material) beliefs and expressions that an individ-
ual or a collective believes they need to possess, whereby said perceived need
results from the will to attain some other, higher purpose(s). For example, a
person who enjoys the way that religion makes them feel (e.g. inspired and
uplifted)—i.e. they want to feel this way for the sake of feeling so—would
be formationally expressing their religion (as an art form). These feelings—
if they are truly sought out of desire, rather than perceived need—do not serve
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as a means to (a) higher purpose(s). By contrast, another, who believes that
their religion should be adhered to or promulgated for the purpose of making
the world a better place—noting the perceived need to achieve an outcome,
whereby religion in this instance is sought to serve as a means of achieving
their higher purpose (bettering of the world)—would be considered to possess
a material religious purpose. Material beliefs and expressions, therefore, are
not limited to those acting in an official capacity (e.g. government officials);
they are present within any entity, private or public, which possesses beliefs
and strives to take corresponding action for any purpose of perceived need. Sci-
entists, politicians, policy makers, police officers, parents, and private citizens,
each working towards their respective purposes in a capacity which is needed,
possess material beliefs and make material expressions relating to these roles.
It is logical (I argue; Primus, 2021) that material and formational states each
have different moral properties due to the distinct and irreducible natures for
which they are respectively sought. Material states, sought for their ability to
serve as a means to an end and existing as a finite resource in any moment,
have a (moral) requirement to be rational in nature. By ‘rational,’ I mean these
states (e.g. beliefs and their resulting expressions) should invoke the selection
of means which are probably the most efficient of all considered means, in
terms of their ability to bring about the realization of sought (individual or
collective) purposes. If a politician holds the purpose of ensuring the equi-
table andefficient deliveryof healthcare to their constituents, yet theirmaterial
beliefs and resulting expression (e.g. policy) prevent this, then said beliefs and
expression can be considered morally wrong on the basis that they are less-
than-wholly-rational (i.e. probably not the most efficient means of achieving
their purpose); these states should be changed (improved) for the betterment
of the constituents, who suffer as a result of their inefficient nature. A con-
sequence of the need for material states to not only exist, but to exist while
operating within specific parameters of efficiency, is the requirement for them
to earnestly pursue clearly defined, literal purposes. In turn, the purpose of any
material state should be treated seriously and interpreted literally by material
observers, even if the nature of its means would appear otherwise.5 For exam-
ple, the beliefs expressed within this article are of a material nature and serve
5 That is to say that the means employed by rational materials will not necessarily be serious
or literal in nature; theymay embody parody or be figurative or vague in composition if these
methods are deemed to probably be the most efficient means of achieving their purpose.
However, the underlying or overarching purpose of any rational material state—whether
expressed literally or figuratively, explicitly or implicitly—should be treated seriously and
interpreted literally by material observers.
Downloaded from Brill.com11/23/2020 08:05:47PM
via free access
174 purism
Secular Studies 2 (2020) 160–178
a material purpose (i.e. to make the world a better place) on the basis that I
believe that Ineed to possess these beliefs and communicate them to theworld.
Accordingly, these expressions (e.g. the above prescription that material and
formational states are to be treated differently for moral purposes) should be
clearly articulated, serious and literal in their purpose, if not also in the means
of their execution.
Formational (desired) states, by contrast and in their capacity as sought
ends, logically possess no requirement to exist in a rational state, nor exist
within any particular parameters or nature, nor even exist at all (Primus, 2021).
By definition, (a belief or expression of) desire cannot be needed as a means
of achieving other purpose(s).6 Rather, these expressions and beliefs are (sub-
jectively) sought for their arbitrary properties in and of themselves. For this
reason, formational beliefs or expressions cannot be judged on their efficiency
(or probable efficiency) of achieving other, higher purpose(s) in the way that
material states can (and should) be evaluated. A corresponding implication
which accompanies the absence of responsibility for formational states to exist
within particular parameters, is the absence of moral value within each of
their states. Formational prescriptions, for example, are not morally binding;
they each exist for the arbitrary reasons that they are personally sought for—
rather than to invokematerial change in the world—and so they should not be
interpreted literally (e.g. as instruction to be enacted or pursued) by material
observers. For example, one may follow a God’s commandments for forma-
tional purposes if they desire to, noting that formational prescriptions need not
be obeyed, and that those who do are nomore or less moral than those who do
not; the formational adoption of religious commandments, like all formational
expressions, is amoral.
It is my personal experience that some contemporaries find the concept of
desire without moral value to be counter intuitive. Firstly, the protected status
of desire—that any desire is nether morally good nor bad, right nor wrong—
is not to be dismissed lightly (however it cannot be defended here; see Primus,
2021). A summary of this argument is that any desire is, by definition, sought
as an end, and logically we can conceive of nothing more valuable than states
which are sought as ends (Primus, 2021). Those who seek to limit or vary any
particular desire (e.g. by branding it to be ‘morally unacceptable’) should pro-
vide a logical reason to do so, lest they be arbitrarily denying the realization of
6 I define a desire as a statewhich is sought for arbitrary, if any, purpose(s). If an entity is needed
it will (implicitly or explicitly) be sought for the logical purpose that it is sought to serve
(Primus, 2021).
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states which are of the greatest conceivable value to a person or people. Sec-
ondly, we can appreciate the intrinsic and ultimate value of desire whilst also
appreciating the inherent challenges posed by empirical conditions (i.e. the
harsh and uncaring nature of physical reality), by stating that any desire should
ideally be realized without limitation or variance to its form. The clause ‘ide-
ally’ recognizes that the realization of individual and societal desires may need
to be temporarily restricted (limited or varied) for logical reasons, and that no
formational belief or expression should be universally prohibited (across space
and time). The first conceivable logical reason for limiting or varying the real-
ization of any desire is if there is a lack of material resource (e.g. if theists and
atheists both desired to hold a convention in a particular amphitheatre at the
same time and therewas insufficient space to physically or safely facilitate both
conventions at once). The second and, I argue, final conceivable logical reason
that the realization of a desiremight be temporarily limited or varied is due to a
lack of mutual desire by thosewhowould be affected by its (full or partial) real-
ization (e.g. if there was sufficient space in the amphitheatre and it was desired
by one group that a joint convention would occur and yet this desire was not
reciprocated by the other group).
The aforementioned Purist prescription, combined with the ontological argu-
ment presented herein, produces a moral purpose upon this article: to reduce
and prevent the occurrence of material beliefs and expressions of religious
faith whilst protecting the right to formational religious freedom. I therefore
aim to reduce instances and expressions of material faith inGodwith this onto-
logical proof, for any action or inaction which is executed in accordance with
material belief in God is irrational, and thus immoral, according to the moral
rationalist framework applied herein (Primus, 2021). For example, the belief
that salvation may come via God may be harmful to the future of all beings
who seek immortality if it is held bymaterial (e.g. human or government) bod-
ies. It is conceivable that humans acting in amaterial capacity who believe that
eternal lifemaybe grantedby an external, theistic agent (i.e. aGod),maybe less
inclined to support thepursuit of eternal life through technological progression
of earthly materials, compared to those who are certain that the manipulation
of earthly materials is the only conceivable means of achieving immortality.
This assertion applies to the highest levels of government, to political lead-
ers and their policies, through to individuals and their voting, lobbying and
donations, to researchers, parents attempting to raise their children to be good
citizens, and to individuals trying to make the world better.
By contrast, according to the aforementioned moral framework, any indi-
vidual ideally has the right to believe and express whatever they desire. The
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worship of any deity which is born out of want, rather than perceived need,
will always be protected as a right from the moral rationalist perspective of
Purism (Primus, 2021). Such expressions of religious belief are, by their defini-
tion, aesthetic in purpose and should be treated as such bymaterial observers. I
call upon all activematerial entities (e.g. humans and government bodies), and
especially those within the New Atheist movement, to recognize this distinc-
tion; pledge to protect the sanctity of formational religious belief and expres-
sion with the same dedication afforded to any other beliefs and expressions of
a formational nature.7
6 Conclusion
In this article I have attempted to deny the conceptual possibility of God(s)—
to ‘rule them out of the equation’—through highlighting that an entity whose
power exists absolutely is inconceivable when considered in conjunction with
the considerationof the absolute nature of space.Whenweconsider thenature
of spacewith sufficient conceptual depthweare forced to conceive of its nature
as absolutely consistent and, by logical necessity, omnipresent.We cannot con-
ceive of difference within individual points of space, yet we can so conceive
that difference exists acrossmultiple points of space—the states of difference
that we know empirically. The reason that we should believe that there is no
God is the same reason that we should believe that space extends infinitely
7 Of course, by use of the terms ‘protection’ and ‘sanctity,’ I am referring to protection and sanc-
tuary fromarbitrarymaterial interference: themoral right for all formational states to exist for
the duration and in the nature that they are desired. This moral right is limited to protecting
formational states from irrationalmaterial expressions andbeliefs, noting thatmaterial states
have an inherent requirement (duty) to be rational in nature and that their expressions (e.g.
prescriptions) are morally binding (i.e. they should be interpreted literally and treated seri-
ously bymaterial observers). For example, it would bemorally impermissible for someone to
possess the material belief (i.e. believe that it is needed) that all religion—including forma-
tional religious beliefs and expressions—should be prohibited (e.g. outlawed); one cannot,
by definition, conceive of a rational or logical reason to universally limit a belief or expres-
sion that is desired (sought as an end). However, this moral right does not “protect” religious
beliefs and expressions—whether formational ormaterial in nature—against parody or den-
igration from those who desire to do so (i.e. “attacks” of a formational nature). It would be
morally permissible for someone to believe or express that all religion should be prohibited,
providing that such a statement exists as a formational nature (i.e. as the desire, rather than
a perceived need, for such an outcome). Notably, as per the prescription within formational
religious beliefs and expressions (e.g. commandments fromGod), the prescriptionwithin any
formational parody or denigration is not morally binding (i.e. it should not be treated seri-
ously or interpreted literally by material observers).
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beyond any point of itself in every direction; it is the same reason that we can-
not conceive of a square circle, or a Penrose triangle in three dimensions. If any
of these conditions—God(s); a limited (non-absolute) space; a square circle; or
a three dimensional Penrose triangle—were possible, their conception would
each necessitate a difference (i.e. > 1) within individual (i.e. 1) points of space
(i.e. > 1 = 1). The basis of our inability to conceive any of these events is our
inability to conceive of inconsistency within space.
The moral implications of irrational religious belief were briefly discussed
through the moral rationalist lens of Purism. Humans can believe in God(s)
if they desire. However, those same humans, while thinking and acting for a
purpose that they (or society) believe(s) they need to serve, as politicians, sci-
entists, teachers, parents, government officials and private citizens seeking to
act responsibly in any moment—those charged with rationally creating and
implementing policy, raising and educating the future generations of human-
ity and generally improving the world to be a better place—must not.
I aim for this article to bring about two outcomes. Firstly, I seek to protect
the sanctity of religious belief and expression, providing it is of a formational
(aesthetic) nature. The ‘New Atheist’ movement—if their primary purpose is
to make the world a better place (possessing a purpose of need)—must rec-
ognize the distinction between formational and material religious beliefs and
expressions. Rational atheists must campaign against material religious beliefs
on the basis of their inherent irrationality, whilst championing the moral right
for any religious belief or expression which is born of desire to ideally be real-
ized. Atheists and theists alike should be striving towards a society where all
types of formational expressions can be realized unless there are logical, con-
ditional (temporal or spatial) reasons preventing their peaceful realization (e.g.
a lack of material resources, or a lack of mutual desire).
Secondly, I envision that this article might deter some material belief in
(passive) faith-based salvation amongst those few theists brave enough to fully
consider the conceivability of God, and who hold the need for truth above
their need to believe in God. Some theists may continue to materially possess
the less-than-rational (i.e. highly improbable) belief that human salvation will
occur through demi-gods of non-human origin; and whilst this is an improve-
menton the (wholly) irrational belief that salvationwill occur throughabsolute
deities (Gods)—which are demonstrated to be inconceivable in this text—the
passive nature of faith is unacceptable as a way forward to human immortal-
ity. It is not the purpose of this article to create division between secular and
theist communities, nor is it to provide condescension towards the latter. The
underlying message of this article is one of hope. I hope that elected officials,
community leaders, parents, and individuals seeking tomake theworld a better
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placewill be inspiredby the realization that, at best, anyGodof any religion can
only be conceived as a very powerful ‘demi-god,’ defined by their relative state
of power; a condition that humans can potentially obtain or even supersede.
I hope that this may promote more-widespread support for mortals gaining
eternal life through their most rational means: becoming forever more ‘god-
like’ through active, technological progression of their materials (i.e. bodies,
tools, infrastructure). The conclusion we must draw from the idapis is that
not only is there the possibility for all humans and their materials to become
demi-gods through the technologicalmanipulationof theirmaterials, butmore
soberingly, that this is the only conceivable method for eternal life and salva-
tion. The notion that God(s) can save us from death or bestow “divine goods”
upon us in an afterlife to compensate for the horrific nature of this world, is not
merely improbable—it is impossible.
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